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Abstract: The requirement of disclosure in the patent specification is commonly presented as 
an essential arm of the patent bargain. This paper tests the assumption that disclosure 
requirements in a number of common law jurisdictions continue to reflect this and other 
shared origins of this doctrine. Instead we see forces such as Europeanisation and sector-
specificity produce divergence and confusion over the purpose of sufficiency, particularly in 
the context of adjacent patentability criteria such as utility and nonobviousness. The result is a 
complex expression of this requirement that has eroded the normative strength of this doctrine 
as originally expressed in Liardet v Johnson. 
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The requirement that a patent should include a specification that contains a 
description of the invention, allowing a person skilled in the art to practise, use or 
work the invention, is a basic tenet of modern patent law in a number of 
jurisdictions. Several legal histories have thrown light on this requirement, which 
was at one time a new concept in the common law. Recent work has corrected 
Hulme’s earlier contention that Mansfield’s decision in Liardet v Johnson (1778)1 was 
a departure from previous English practice. Adams and Averley, and Walterscheid 
among others, note that the specification developed some time at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century when law officers began to require a written specification as 
a condition of the patent grant and thereafter to make it a routine requirement.2  
There is also a subtle point of disagreement on whether Liardet amounted to 
the mere formalisation of the gradual change in the law from what the inventor 
brings by way of personal effort and capital to the disclosure in the patent 
specification, or in fact spelt the beginning of the end of this process.3 Some time 
before Lord Mansfield’s observations in this case, the principal aim of the patent 
grant shifted. Indeed, ‘neither specification nor written disclosure was required in 
the vast majority of Elizabethan grants’4 – a feature that follows from the original 
consideration offered for monopoly privileges – to work the industry and train 
English apprentices.5 However, there seems to be general agreement that Lord 
Mansfield’s third instruction to the jury in Liardet formalised the point at which the 
law began to accept written descriptions as a condition and requirement of the 
patent grant:  
 
The third point is whether the specification is such as instructs others to 
make it. For the condition of giving encouragement is this: that you must 
specify upon record your invention in such a way as to teach an artist, when 
the term is out, to make it – and to make it as well by your directions: for 
then at the end of the term, the public shall have benefit of it.  
 
The disclosure in the patent specification has since then been restated in terms of 
a ‘contract’, a quid pro quo with the state in return for the grant of a patent. 
MacLeod, for example, writes that with the above words, ‘for the first time, the 
recognised quid pro quo for the award of a patent was the disclosure of the 
invention’.6 Mossoff in particular suggests that the restatement of the substantive 
                                                     
1 Liardet v Johnson (1778) 1 WPC 53 (reproduced in Hayward’s Patent Cases, vol 1, 196–201). 
2 JN Adams and G Averley, ‘The Patent Specification: The Role of Liardet v Johnson’ (1986) 7 Journal of 
Legal History 156–177 and EC Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: American Patent Law and 
Administration, 1798–1836 (Rothman and Co, Colorado 1998) 399–420. 
3 Adams and Averly ‘The Patent Specification’ (n 2). 
4 RA Klitzke, ‘Historical Background of the English Patent Law’ (1959) 41 Journal of the Patent Office Society 
615, 641–642. 
5 See C MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The English Patent System, 1660–1800 (Cambridge, CUP, 
2002) 48–49. 
6 Ibid 49. Also see Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts (n 2) 404. 
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principle behind the requirement of the specifications was in effect predicated on 
a natural rights approach to patents, specifically Locke’s social contract theory.7  
Over-use of this imprecise ‘quid pro quo’ metaphor can lead to confusion 
particularly as the interpretation of the ‘contract’ is entrusted to two different 
tribunals. Others have noted that the so-called contract theory or bargain is useful 
not as a justification but as an explanation in law of the mechanics of the 
evaluation and granting of patents.8 The origin of the patent specification appears 
historically to be rooted in an instrumental view of what the patent system could 
achieve and what was administratively most feasible9 – an approach that endures 
within some contexts of modern disclosure requirements (such as ‘subjective’ best 
mode disclosures in the US and timing of amendments in Australian law). In 
modern patent statutes, an expedient approach to disclosure requirements is 
perhaps best reflected in the lack of detail in many provisions describing 
sufficiency. This lack of detail has facilitated diverse legal doctrines and outcomes 
in different jurisdictions, even in association with apparently simple requirements.  
Professor Vaver refers to the contract or bargain metaphor as nothing more 
than a rhetorical flourish whose sustained use is damaging to certainty in 
intellectual property law.10 At the very least, the idea glosses over the prosaic 
institutional and administrative beginnings of the requirement to provide a 
specification; at worst, the metaphor is a source of error and confusion. The 
discussion in this chapter attempts to demonstrate that although the bargain 
metaphor is a useful indicator of the common history of patents, the idea may be 
used to justify so many variations on what amounts to sufficient disclosure that it 
is of little analytical value. This chapter focuses on two aspects of contemporary 
common law: the divergence in sufficiency requirements and the overlap between 
sufficiency and other criteria of invalidity. Both aspects expose distortions of the 






                                                     
7 A Mossoff, ‘Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800’ (2001) 52 
Hastings Law Journal 1255. 
8 WC Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions (Boston, Little Brown, 1890) 59. 
9 MacLeod believes the rise of the specification in the early to mid-eighteenth century shifted 
responsibility from the law officers to the courts thus allowing the system to be self-policing and the 
law officers to be spared much tedious investigation. MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution (n 5) 51, 
53. 
10 D Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trademarks (Toronto, Irwin Law, 1977) 12–13, 
suggesting that the metaphor or analogy was perhaps more useful in the eighteenth century when 
intellectual property laws were cryptic and each patent was self-contained and spelt out the conditions 
of its grant. See also Tim Roberts, ‘Sufficiency of Disclosure (Enabling Disclosure, Disclosure of Prior 
Art, Best Mode’ (2006), available at  
<http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/presentations/scp_of_ge_06_roberts.pdf> 
accessed 5th April 2009.  
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ARE PATENT DISCLOSURES USEFUL SOURCES OF TECHNICAL 
INFORMATION? 
 
It is useful first to consider briefly the continued relevance in a modern context of 
the aim of disclosure stated so clearly in Liardet, principally whether ‘the 
specification is such as instructs others to make it’. What is the true value of patent 
disclosures – are patent specifications useful sources of technical information? 
Machlup and Penrose point out that although the diffusion of technology through 
patent disclosures is an old argument, economists have been sceptical of it at least 
since the 1950s.11  Not all patentable inventions are patented and concealable 
inventions remain concealed;12 therefore, the argument goes that patents reveal 
little that would not otherwise be revealed.13 Economic literature is peppered with 
explicit findings that patent disclosures appear to have no measurable impact on 
information flows from other firms and therefore no measurable impact on R & 
D productivity.14 
However, case law in a number of jurisdictions weaves a different narrative, 
and observations such as those made in Paulik v. Rizkalla remain exceptional but 
valuable indicators of the significance of technical disclosures in patents: 
  
The obligation to disclose is not the principal reason for a patent system; 
indeed, it is a rare invention that cannot be deciphered more readily from its 
commercial embodiment than from the printed patent.15 
  
Clarisa Long mirrors this concern when she emphasises that patents often tell 
observers more about the patentee (for example about the financial prospects of 
the firm) than the invention itself.16 
An interesting insight into the disparity between legal reasoning and 
economic accounts is provided by recent empirical surveys that highlight the 
increasing complexity and voluminosity of patent applications.17 Does this 
                                                     
11 F Malchup and E Penrose, ‘The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century’ (1950) 10(1) The 
Journal of Economic History 1-29. 
12However, see J Bessen, ‘Patents and The Diffusion of Technology’, available at www.researchonin-
novation.org/disclose.pdf. 
13 See B Roin, ‘Disclosure Function of the Patent System (Or Lack Thereof)’ (2005) 118(6) Harvard Law 
Review 2007, debunking several assumptions about whether patents disseminate technical information. 
14 A Arora et al, ‘R&D and the Patent Premium’ NBER Working Paper No 9431, 2003. available at 
www.nber.org/papers/w9431. Also see W Cohen et al, ‘R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to 
Innovate in Japan and the United States’ (2002) 31(8–9) Research Policy, 1349–67 and M Hall et al, 
‘Barriers to the Use of Patent Information in UK Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Part 2(1): 
Results of In-depth Interviews’ (2000) 26(2) Journal of Information Science 87–99, 94. 
15 Paulik v Rizkalla 760 F 2d 1270, 1276 (Fed Cir. 1985). 
16 C Long, ‘Patent Signals’ (2002) 69 University of Chicago Law Review 625–679. Also see L Oppenheim, 
‘How SMEs Use the Patent Literature’ Summary Report for the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council (1998). 
17 Based on the number of pages and number of claims. The study also considers other parameters of size 
with respect to other recent surveys. E Archontopoulous et al, ‘When Small is Beautiful: Measuring the 
Evolution and Consequences of the Voluminosity of Patent Applications at the EPO’, CEB Working 
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development indicate a more thorough disclosure of inventions, or does it merely 
represent disruptive strategies, such as creating uncertainty by ‘polluting the 
technological field or circumventing disclosure requirements by hiding major 
inventions’?18 
Zeebroeck’s study points out several results that shed light on the effect of 
varied disclosure requirements in the law.19 For example, emerging sectors 
(biotech, computer science, audio, video and medial technologies) with less 
established vocabulary and practices can lead to larger patent applications than 
more traditional areas.20 Drafting styles also account for important differences 
between civil and common law countries, with the latter having much longer 
patents on average. This difference would not be a problem for the common law 
in itself but for the increasing success of the PCT route, resulting in the 
harmonisation of drafting styles worldwide towards the US model.21 
However, it is often substantive legal requirements that lead to voluminous 
disclosures. These include the doctrine of equivalents in the US that effectively 
encourages applicants to embed within their drafts detailed fall-back options that 
can be used in case of litigation, to salvage as much of the scope of the patent as 
possible. The mandatory best mode requirement in US applications often results 
in patentees detailing several utilisation modes to hide the ‘best’ one, possibly 
leading to longer descriptions.  
Additionally, although it is in the public interest to have all prior art 
considered by the patent office, only US law takes a stringent view on the 
disclosure of prior art. The patent applicant is obliged to disclose all prior art of 
which he is aware, failing which the patent may be unenforceable, possibly 
triggering treble damages in infringement actions. This approach can lead to an ‘if 
in doubt, disclose’ rule, resulting in long lists of marginal relevance, making 
examination more difficult and adding to the expense of litigation.22 On the other 
hand, the UK and Australia do not require specific disclosure of relevant art, 
except for citations made in parallel applications prosecuted in other countries.23 
Changes  to  New  Zealand’s  Patents  Act 1953, expected to come into effect this 
year, will require similar disclosure of the results of prior art searches made on 
corresponding overseas applications relating to the same invention.24 Despite 
these differences if the application is filed through the PCT route and claims US 
                                                                                                                                       
Paper 06/019 (2006). Also see JW Dudas, ‘The Patent System Today and Tomorrow’, Statement 
Before the Subcommittee on The Judiciary, United States Senate (2005). 
18 Archontopoulous, ‘When Small is Beautiful’ (n 17). 
19 N van Zeebroeck et al, ‘Claiming More: The Increased Voluminosity of Patent Applications and its 
Determinants’, Working Paper CEB 06–018 RS (2006). 
20 This resonates with ‘intrinsic uncertainty’ in emerging technologies. S Thambisetty, ‘Patents as 
Credence Goods’ (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 707–40. 
21 Zeebroeck, ‘Claiming More’ (n 19). 
22 T Roberts, ‘Sufficiency of Disclosure (Enabling Disclosure, Disclosure of Prior Art, Best Mode’ (2006), 
available at 
www.wipo.int/meetings/en/2006/scp_of_ge_06/presentations/scp_of_ge_06_roberts.pdf. 
23 Ibid, but see r 26, EPO Guidelines. 
24 Patents Bill 235– (2008) cl 9. 
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priority then it is likely to adopt the disclosure requirements of the US patent 




DISCLOSURE AND ENABLEMENT: TIMING,  
ANTICIPATION AND BEST MODE 
 
The centrality of disclosure remains an agreed principle in common law 
jurisdictions25 while insufficiency of disclosure is a ground for attacking the 
validity of a patent.26 The various twists and turns of this central principle in 
different jurisdictions beg the question of the quid pro quo. The following is a 
discussion of three features based on a common denominator that the 
specification must be sufficient to disclose the invention clearly enough and 
completely enough for it to be performed by a person skilled in the art without 
undue burden.  Generally, ‘the key word is “undue”, not “experimentation”’.27  
First, the date of the assessment is pivotal because it indicates, inter alia, the  
content  of  the  common  general  knowledge  that  may  supplement  the 
disclosure  in  the  specification. In most jurisdictions including in the UK and US, 
the law requires that the invention be fully described at the date of filing of the 
application. However, in Australia, while section 40(2)(a) requires a ‘complete 
specification to describe the invention fully including the best method known to 
the applicant of performing the invention’, there is no further direction as to the 
date at which adequate disclosure is to be assessed. Case law has veered between 
the filing date and the date of patent grant.28 In Pfizer Overseas Pharmaceuticals v Eli 
Lilly and Company29 the requirement of disclosing the best method known to the 
applicant was held satisfied by the full Federal Court even though the relevant 
method was introduced into the specification some three years after the filing.  
The operative limitations on the power of amendment are the same in UK 
and Australian law. The test of added subject matter is whether a skilled man 
would, upon looking at the amended specification, learn anything about the 
                                                     
25 ss 14(3) and 14(5)(c), The UK Patents Act (linking concepts drawn from Arts 83 and 84 of the EPC, s 
40 of the Australian Patents Act 1990, s 27 of the Canadian Patents Act 1985, 35 USC § 112 (1986) and 
s 10, New Zealand Patents Act 1953). 
26 In the UK s 72(1) (which does not as such include non-compliance with s 14(5)(c)), s 138(3) in 
Australia which cites the list of grounds for revocation, 35 USC § 282 (2000), s 41(h), (i) New Zealand 
Patents Act 1953, s 53 Canadian Patents Act 1985. 
27 Re Angstadt 537 F 2d 498, 504 (Cust and Pat App 1976). ‘Undue burden’ is sensitive to the nature of the 
invention, to the abilities of the skilled person, and the art in which the invention has been made. 
Wobben v. Vestas-Celtic Wind Technology Ltd [2007] EWHC 2636 (Pats) [197]. 
28 In Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 205, an obiter comment by Gummow J 
noted that adequacy of disclosure must be judged with reference to the filing date. However, in 
Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd v Arico Trading International Pty Ltd (2001) 207 CLR 1 (Gleeson CJ, 
McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ) the HC took an opposite view, stating that the relevant 
time was when the patent was granted. 
29 Pfizer Overseas Pharmaceuticals v Eli Lilly and Company [2005] FCAFC 224. 
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invention that he could not learn from the unamended specification,30 including 
what is disclosed implicitly and explicitly. However, putting together the 
requirement of ‘complete specification’ with the scope of allowable amendments 
under section 102, the Australian Federal Court concluded that it is the 
specification as amended that must be construed for compliance with section 
40(2)(a). On this basis the date for assessing complete disclosure was not earlier 
than the grant and could be as late as the date of commencement of proceedings.  
While a key restraint on this aspect of disclosure continues to be the date at 
which common general knowledge is assessed,31 the possibility that new matter 
can be introduced into a specification as late as the date of grant of a patent is a 
serious divergence from other common law jurisdictions32 and is in effect a 
distortion of the ‘bargain’ metaphor; it potentially allows the applicant to withhold 
until grant the full nature of the invention and the means for performing it, leading 
to considerable uncertainty for the public and competitors.  
Secondly, central to the law of sufficiency is ‘enablement’ – a concept that 
owes much to judicial exegesis.33 Under US law, §112 is interpreted in such a way 
that three distinct requirements, including the enablement requirement (the other 
two being the written description and best mode requirement), are said to spring 
from it.34 In the UK enablement has been found to exist in a number of contexts 
in patent law,35 and the principle ‘explained in Beloit and General Tire has been 
accepted in Canada without reservation.’36  
In the context of sufficiency of disclosure there may be enablement even if 
the skilled man needed to correct obvious errors or depart in obvious ways from 
the teaching in the patent application – a concession that extends to the 
requirement for anticipatory enablement under novelty in the UK.37 Following on 
from Synthon, the Canadian Supreme Court accepted a two-part test whereby prior 
disclosure and enablement would need to be considered separately and proven for 
anticipation. Noting Lord Hoffmann’s alignment of enablement in anticipation 
and sufficiency, the SC declined to consider whether the law in Canada is identical 
to the UK position.38   
                                                     
30 Richardson-Vicks Patent  [1995] RPC 568, 576. Also see Corus Uk Ltd v Qual-Chem Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 
1177. 
31 Pfizer v Eli Lilly (n 29) [327]–[328], [385]–[391]. The court stopped short of deciding whether there is a 
latest date by which an amendment may never be allowed in order to overcome a specification’s failure 
to state the best method as required by s 40(2)(a). Also see discussion in [366]–[378] 
32 ‘Getting the Balance Right: Toward a Stronger and More Efficient IP Rights System’, IP Australia 
Consultation Paper (March 2009) [3.2]. 
33 Synthon BV v Smithkline Beecham Plc [2005] UKHL 59 [26]–[27] 
34 R Merges, P Menell and M Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age, 3rd edn (Aspen 
Publishers, 2003) 201. 
35 Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK's Application [1991] RPC 485 
36 Apotex Inc v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc 2008 SCC 61 [22] citing Free World Trust v Lectro Sant Inc 2000 
SCC 66. 
37 Synthon v Smithkline Beecham (n 33). A proposition previously rejected by the CA in BASF v Smithkline 
Beecham plc [2003] RPC 49. 
38 Apotex v Sanofi-Synthelabo (n 36) [26]. 
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While recognising the value of the phrase ‘enabling disclosure’ with respect to 
the disclosure required for anticipation of a process or method claim, the law in 
Australia finds little, if any, relevance of this phrase to the anticipation of a 
product claim or a claim for a chemical compound by formula. The novelty of a 
product claim lies in the product, and not the means of producing it39 – this 
limited but significant divergence in the law of novelty destroying disclosures is 
compounded in another way.  
Australian law requires that anticipatory disclosures be of appropriate quality 
to form the basis for revoking patents for want of novelty. The reverse 
infringement test is still a necessary condition for anticipation in UK law but it is 
no longer sufficient – a position that is shared historically in Australian law.40 But 
in an approach that is much narrower than ‘enabling disclosure’, laid out so 
elegantly by Lord Hoffmann in Synthon, Australian law requires anticipatory 
disclosures to teach (direct, recommend or suggest) the claimed invention with 
sufficient clarity41 and there will be no anticipation if the person skilled in the art 
was forced to ‘rummage through the flag locker’ to find a flag which the prior 
patentee possessed and could have raised.42 
Thirdly, during the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, practice 
and common law had come to distinguish between the part of the specification in 
which the patentee discharged his duty to disclose the best way of performing the 
invention and the part that delimited the scope of the monopoly that he claimed.43 
Historically a statement of the best method of performance of the invention as an 
integral aspect of the quid pro quo, was required even before statutes expressly 
required it.44 The duty of the patent applicant to disclose the best method of 
performing his invention continued in the UK until the changes brought about by 
the 1977 Act.45 It remains the law in the US where the specification must inter alia 
‘set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his 
invention’.46  
How broadly the requirement sweeps has been a matter of considerable 
confusion and dispute.47 In the US ambiguity rises chiefly from the language in 35 
USC § 112, as ‘mode’ and ‘carrying out the invention’ are terms that are not 
                                                     
39 Apotex Pty Ltd (formerly GenRx Pty Ltd) v Sanofi-Aventis [2008] FCA 1194 [49].  
40 Meyers Taylor Pty Ltd v Vicar Industries Ltd (1977) 137 CLR 228, 235 
41 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v FH Faulding and Co Ltd (2000) 97 FCR 524. Also see Nicaro Holdings v Martin 
Engineering (1990) 91 ALR 513 (the terms of the prior art must enable the skilled person to ‘perceive 
and understand and be able practically to apply the discovery without the necessity of further 
experiments’.) 
42 ICI Chemicals and Polymers Ltd v The Lubrizol Corp Inc [2000] FCA 1349 [51]. 
43 Kirin Amgen v Hoechst Marion Roussel [2005] All ER 667, 677, Lord Hoffmann citing Fletcher-Moulton L 
J in British United Shoe Machinery v A Fussell and Sons (1908) 25 RPC 631, 650. 
44 Liardet v Johnson (n 1) 198. 
45 ss 32(1)(h) and 4(3)(b), 1949 Act. 
46 35 USC § 102(b). 
47 C Marchese, ‘Confusion, Uncertainty and the Best Mode Requirement’ (1992) 2 Federal Circuit Bar 
Journal 1. 
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definable with precision.48 The requirement here, as in Australia49 and New 
Zealand,50 is designed to prevent a patentee from ‘holding back’ information, in 
effect maintaining part of the invention as a trade secret while protecting the 
whole under patent law.51 However, neither US nor Australian law52 requires the 
best mode to be identified, increasing the possibility of voluminous applications 
where a number of modes of performing the invention may be safely buried. 
Further, under Australian law section 40(2)(a) requires a complete 
specification to ‘describe the invention fully including the best method known to 
the applicant of performing the invention.’ This is generally regarded as the 
requirement of sufficiency of description,53 for purposes of assessing which it is 
not necessary to disclose all alternative means.54 Given that the ‘best method’ 
requirement is an inclusion in the sufficiency requirement, it is subject to the same 
date of assessment, namely the date of grant (the date by which a complete 
specification, with amendments, if any, is filed).55 In contrast, the time for 
determining compliance with the ‘best mode’ in US law is the date of filing; this 
cannot be rectified subsequently by amendments. The divergence in timing is a 
challenge to the bargain metaphor as Australian law appears to allow the patentee 
to monopolise a greater field than has been disclosed to the public. 
The ‘best mode’ requirement is emerging as a stormy issue in international 
harmonisation negotiations – the US, Brazil, India and Mexico are in favour of 
providing best mode disclosure, although most countries are against it.56 Given 
that Article 29(1) of the TRIPS Agreement states that members ‘may’ require the 
applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the 
inventor at the filing date, or where priority is claimed, at the priority date of the 
invention; substantive harmonisation on best mode requirements seem unlikely to 
take place. However, as noted above, due to international filing strategies via PCT 
applications, it is likely to become the norm, at least in those applications that 
claim US priority. 
 
                                                     
48 Wahl Instruments Inc v Acvious Inc 950 F 2d 1575, 1579 (CAFC 1991). Also see C Marchese, ‘Promoting 
the Progress of the Useful Arts by Narrowing Best Mode Disclosure Requirements in Patent Law’ 
(1993) 54 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 589 and J Allison and M Lemley, ‘Empirical Evidence on the 
Validity of Litigated Patents’ (1998) 26 American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal 185 
(estimating that this ‘subjective element of US patent law has been the cause of at least 10 per cent of 
all patent invalidations in the 1990s’. In Northern Telecom Inc v Datapoint Corp 908 F 2d 931, 946 (Fed Cir) 
Newman J observes that the best mode ‘challenge is easy.’ 
49 s 40(2)(a). 
50 s 10(3)(b). 
51 ‘The sole purpose of the best mode requirement is to restrain inventors from applying for patents while 
at the same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments of their inventions which they 
have in fact conceived.’ Re Gay 309 F 2d 769, 772 (CCPA 1962). 
52 Pfizer (n 29) [374]. 
53  Ibid [328]. 
54 Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 58 [60]. 
55 Pfizer (n 29) [347] – a position that is in keeping with English case law under the 1949 Act. C Van Der 
Lely NV v Ruston Engineering Co Ltd [1993] RPC 45 (56). 
56 C Correa, ‘The Politics & Practicalities of a Disclosure of Origin Obligation’ (2005) 7/98 South Bulletin, 
February.  
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FAIR BASIS AND BROAD CLAIMS 
 
One of the most exciting recent developments in common law jurisdictions has 
been the reconsideration of Biogen v Medeva57 by the House of Lords, in Generics 
(UK) Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S.58 While the review of insufficiency is interesting in 
itself, it highlights the overlaps between insufficiency and other grounds of 
invalidity, and is of broad relevance to the assessment of the quid pro quo. The 
specific question framed as a matter of divergence between the UK and Australian 
law is this: how does the fair basing principle as a ground of invalidity differ 
between the UK and Australia, and what do these differences mean for the ability 
to prevent broad claims that are unsupported by adequate disclosure?  
Modern insufficiency in the UK links two concepts drawn from EPC Articles 
83 and 84 which are echoed in section 14(3) (requiring clear and complete 
disclosure) and section 14(5)(c) (requiring claims to be supported by the 
description) of the 1977 UK Patents Act. Although only the former is a basis for 
revocation under section 72, since Asahi, the requirements of section 14(3) have 
been read to necessarily include the latter.59 Thus the substantive effect of section 
14(5)(c), namely that the description should, together with the rest of the 
specification, constitute an enabling disclosure, is given effect by section 72(1)(c).60  
In Australian law there is a not dissimilar split, in that section 40(2)(a) of the 
Patents Act 1990 requires a complete specification to describe the invention fully 
(including the best method), and section 40(3) provides that the claim or claims be 
clear and succinct and fairly based on the matter disclosed in the specification. 
Unlike the fusion seen above in UK law, non-compliance of each is a distinct 
ground of revocation, as a result of which considerable judicial time has been 
spent on analysing what the ‘fair basis’ ground might involve that can invalidate a 
patent, over and beyond the requirement of a complete specification.61  
In the UK, under the Patents Act 1949, an inventor was bound to disclose 
information about the invention in good faith and honesty,62 in addition to which 
section 32(1)(i) required that the claim be ‘fairly based on the matter disclosed in 
the specification’. Both of these provisions are at the heart of the quid pro quo of 
patents, such as it exists. Before the introduction of this statutory fair basis 
objection in 1949, the House of Lords had formulated the substance of the 
provision in the following terms:  
 
 
                                                     
57 Biogen v Medeva [1997] RPC 1 (HL). 
58 Generics (UK) Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2009] UKHL 12. 
59 Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK’s Application [1991] RPC 485, 535–36. 
60 Biogen (n 57) 47. 
61 In particular see Lockwood v Doric (n 54). 
62 The Patents Act 1949 s 32(1)(h) required the description to be fair and to disclose the best method 
known to the patentee. See WR Cornish and D Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade 
Marks and Allied Rights (London, Sweet & Maxwell 2003) 164, 229–30. 
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It is the consideration which the patentee gives to the public by disclosing his 
inventive idea which entitles him in return to protection for an article which 
embodies his idea, but not for an article which is described in terms which 
cover things quite unrelated to his idea and which do not embody it at all.63  
 
The disappearance of these provisions, and the compulsion to follow related EPO 
authorities, led Lord Hoffmann to state in Biogen that the general principle of ‘lack 
of fair basis’ exists in substance so that where the breadth of the claims exceeds 
the invention disclosed the court may apply a broader approach to ‘enabled 
disclosure’.  
In Australian law as elsewhere, Biogen was interpreted as authority for the 
proposition that the breadth of a claim will exceed the ‘technical contribution’ to 
the art if it claims every way of achieving a result but only enables one such way.64 
This decision created unease in Australia in a pre-Generics era and in the context of 
the lack of an explicit fair basis provision in the UK. Due to the fair basis 
provision in section 40(3), the decision was relegated in relevance, as being a better 
fit for the question of sufficiency in section 40(2). Thus the High Court in 
Lockwood Security Products took the position that it was ‘Lord Hoffmann’s view […] 
that it was a requirement of English law that there be an enabling disclosure across 
the whole width of the claim. That is not and never has been the law in 
Australia’.65 Whether this really makes Australian law ‘mechanistic and 
impoverished’ in the sense in which Lord Hoffmann applied the words in Biogen to 
the general rule that an invention was sufficiently disclosed if the skilled man could 
make a single embodiment, is debatable. On fair basing however, it was enough 
for the Australian High Court to declare that current UK law is no guide to 
Australian law.66  
There is another persuasive reason for the High Court to move away from 
the UK’s approach to fairness, and this is the confusion evident in Biogen and 
addressed explicitly in Generics regarding the so-called ‘consistory’,67 or ‘covetous’ 
claim68 or broad claim of a general principle or application. The proposition in 
Fuel Oils/EXXON69 that is the genesis of the approach to insufficiency in Biogen is 
this: ‘that the extent of the monopoly as defined by the claims should correspond 
to the “technical contribution” to the art in order for it to be supported or 
justified.’ In evaluating its application in Biogen Lord Hoffmann uses ‘inventive 
                                                     
63 Mullard Radio Valve Co Ltd v Philco Radio and Television Corporation of Great Britain (1936) 53 RPC 323, 347. 
64 Lockwood v Doric (n 54) [63]–[67] 
65 Per Bannon in Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd v Arico Trading International Pty Ltd  (2001) 207 CLR 1. 
66 Lockwood v Doric (n 54) [67]. 
67 ‘A general description of what the invention is said to consist of’ normally followed by parts of the 
specification that describe features that ‘generally’ or ‘preferably’ exist, and illustrative, rather than 
exhaustive of how the invention might be put into effect. This kind of clause is identified by the courts 
as originate from a time before the 1883 Patents, Trademarks and Designs Act which made it 
compulsory for the first time to list the claims separately: Lockwood v Doric (n 54) [10], [91]–92]. 
68 A ‘central claim that travels beyond the matter disclosed in the specification’: ibid [58] citing Mullard v 
Philco (n 63) 21. 
69 Fuel Oils/EXXON [1994] OJEPO 653. 
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concept’ interchangeably with ‘technical contribution to the art.’70  
In contrast, the House of Lords in Generics is at pains to distinguish between 
the two concepts – a difficult task in abstraction. Thus: 
 
inventive concept is concerned with the identification of the core of the 
invention – the idea or principle, of more or less general application which 
entitles the inventor’s achievement to be called inventive. The invention’s 
technical contribution to the art is concerned with the evaluation of its 
inventive concept – how far forward has it carried the state of the art?  
 
It is crucial to note that the distance and difference between the two concepts is 
not firmly established as the decision tries to define the extra-statutory ‘technical 
contribution to the art’ regularly adopted by the TBA of the EPO. In fact Lord 
Neuberger notes that the insufficiency reasoning apart from the Biogen reasoning 
given by Kitchin J in the lower court was similar to arguments considered on 
obviousness by the Board in a number of cases.71 Further it is the focus on 
inventive step for product claims that can lead to error; where the claim is for a 
process or includes a process, the issue of how the alleged invention was achieved, 
in other words, the inventive step, may be more to the point.72 Generics clearly 
limits the applicability of the Biogen insufficiency principle to rare cases where the 
claim is to a product identified in part by how it was made and in part by what it 
did.  
Thus although Generics has reconsidered Biogen insufficiency, it also highlights 
the difficulty in keeping ‘inventive step’ separate from ‘technical contribution to 
the art’ in the context of insufficiency.  This problem is unlikely to go away for at 
least two reasons. First the fair basis objection that endures and can be traced to 
Fuel Oils/EXXON historically overlaps in the common law with other grounds of 
invalidity including obviousness.73 The second reason is the willingness of the 
TBA of the EPO to conflate inventive step and inadequacy of disclosure in a line 
of authority where claims to broad classes of chemical compounds alleged to have 
some common technical effect have been rejected for obviousness when there is 
nothing to show that they would all have that technical effect. 74  
Lockwood’s rejection of Biogen is suffused with the need to avoid a similar 
conflation between issues of obviousness and fair basing, which perhaps provides 
a kinder justification of the divergence than Lord Mance’s amusement in Generics 
                                                     
70 Generics v Lundbeck (n 58) [45]. 
71 Ibid [89] referring to reasons given by Kitchin J in [2007] RPC 32 [264]–[265]. 
72 Ibid [101]. 
73 TA Blanco White, Patents for Inventions and the Protection of Industrial Designs, 5th edn (London, Stevens and 
Sons, 1983) [4-801]. However, White did not cite any authorities to support this view, only illustrations 
based on ‘overlapping’ provisions. Also see Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd (n 54) [47]. 
74 AGREVO/Triazoles T 0939/92 [1996] OJEPO 309. See for example the obviousness analysis in 
evaluating insufficiency in Scinopharm Taiwan Ltd v Eli Lily and Company [2009] EWHC 631 (Pat) [140]–
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would seem to indicate.75 More to the point, the kind of fair basing apparently 
achieved in Biogen and which persists in EPO jurisprudence is not the same as the 
words ‘fairly based’ in section 40(3), where they refer to a relationship between 
what is claimed and what is described in the body of the specification. They do 




SPECULATIVE INVENTIONS AND SUFFICIENCY 
 
The idea of the patent bargain seems almost lyrical and the divergence in 
interpretations shows the limited value it has as a unifying analytical concept. An 
emerging theme apparent from the discussion of sufficiency and fair basing, is the 
manner in which disclosure requirements may overlap with other validity criteria. 
Such overlap is directly related to the assessment and disclosure of the 
consideration given in exchange for a patent. This potential source of confusion 
and error may be further explored in the context of specifications that contain no 
more than speculative information about the usefulness or industrial application of 
an invention.   
Increasingly, ‘utility’ under US patent law is being adopted as the terminology 
of choice to describe the ‘usefulness’ of an invention over and above ‘industrial 
application’, despite several reasons why this conflation may be substantively 
inaccurate.76 Nonetheless, utility elaborated as ‘specific, substantial and credible’ 
has been used by the EPO, UKIPO, the UK High Court,77 is a part of the new 
Patents Bill in NZ,78 is included in the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement,79 and figures prominently in international negotiations.80  
That the correspondence between ‘utility’ as it is applied in US law and 
‘industrial application’ in the UK is superficial can be gathered from the 
differences in the relationship between each of these criteria (as conventionally 
understood) to disclosure and enablement requirements. In US law subsequent to 
Brenner v Manson81 it was established that the enablement requirement, or the ‘how 
                                                     
75 Generics v Lundbeck (n 58) [56]. 
76 Some of these include the association of ‘industrial’ with ‘technical’, (‘utility’ does not suffer a similar 
link), and the public policy concerns associated with ‘industrial’ that is not matched under ‘utility’. For a 
detailed analysis of these and other differences, see S Thambisetty, ‘Legal Transplants in Patent Law: 
Why “Utility” is the new “Industrial Applicability”’ (2009) 49 Jurimetrics 155–201. 
77 Eli Lilly and Company v Human Genome Sciences Inc, [2008] EWHC 1903 (Pat) [187] applied by Laboratorios 
Almirall SA v Boehringer Ingelheim International GmbH [2009] EWHC 102 (Pat). 
78 See n 24. The explanatory notes say that for an invention to be useful, the Bill requires that inventions 
demonstrate specific, substantial and credible utility. 
79 Arts 17.1 and 17.9. Currently in Australian law usefulness is only a ground for opposition and 
revocation through courts, and is not assessed during examination. Several bodies, including the 
Australian Law Review Commission and IPAustralia recommend the inclusion of usefulness during 
examination which would only be satisfied if the specification discloses a specific, substantial and 
credible use for the invention. ‘Getting the Balance Right’ (n 32) [5.1]. 
80 For example, see WIPO Standing Committee on The Law of Patents, SCP 7/8 (2002) [167], [171]. 
81 Brenner v Manson 383 US 519 (1966). 
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to use’ prong of § 112 incorporates the requirement of 35 USC § 101 that the 
specification disclose as a matter of fact a practical utility for the invention. If the 
application fails as a matter of fact to satisfy § 101 then the application also fails as 
a matter of law to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to use the invention.82 
From here utility in US law has developed as the bridge between speculation and 
specificity based on actual experimental evidence disclosed or ‘well-established’ 
conventions in a technological field. It is this context that brings a threat of 
confusion between the functional roles of utility and the written description and 
enablement requirements – a matter of concern for those jurisdictions that have 
adopted the ‘specific, substantial and credible’ standard of utility. 
In the context of ‘speculative inventions’, a line of cases has developed in the 
US where the examiners require further substantiating evidence of utility, unless 
one with ordinary skill in the art would accept the allegation as obviously correct. 
Amgen Inc v Chugai Pharmaceutical Co83 illustrates this approach. The CAFC 
invalidated Amgen’s broad claims supported by an insufficient number of 
examples of use. Due to the lack of predictability in the art of isolating and using 
purified DNA sequences encoding for human erythropoietin the court held that 
‘for DNA sequences, [an applicant must disclose] how to make and use enough 
sequences to justify the grant of the claims sought’.84 This suggests that if the 
applicant is able to fully enable his invention the court may have been less 
stringent in applying utility as a ground for invalidity; correspondingly if the 
enablement is weak, the court may well demand a complete and specific indication 
of utility. 
The conflation between utility and enablement in US law is often 
accompanied  by sector-specific rules of disclosure that do not apply to other areas 
– such as in the case of gene sequences85 and human gene therapy where the 
USPTO appears to have set up a presumption that the field itself is 
unpredictable.86 The USPTO Utility Guidelines suggest that the methods to treat 
unspecified diseases do not meet the substantial utility prong of the specific, 
substantial and credible test of utility.87 Hence claims specifying a pharmaceutical 
composition without a disease target (a likely scenario, given the state of the art in 
gene therapy) or specifying a method for introducing genes without a gene therapy 
                                                     
82 Re Zeigler 26 USPQ 1600, 992 F 2d 1197 (Fed Cir 1993) 1200–201. 
83 Amgen Inc v Chugai Pharmaceutical Co 927 F 2d 1200, (Fed Cir 1991) 1212-14. 
84 Ibid 1215. 
85 For a general discussion of industry specific practice related to written description see DL Burk and M 
Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 1575. 
86 USPTO, ‘Training Materials for Examining Patent Applications With Respect to 35 USC § 112, First 
Paragraph – Enablement Chemical/Biotechnological Applications (1996), Example G. This is guided 
in part by an NIH report cited specifically by the USPTO as evidence of the state of the art. SH Orkin 
and AG Motulsky, ‘Report and Recommendation of the Panel to assess the NIH Investment in 
Research on Gene Therapy’, NIH (1995), available at www.nih.gov.news/panelrep.html. 
87 USPTO, Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials (1999). 
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target may fail the substantial utility test, as a result of which an enablement 
rejection follows.88 
In contrast to the above, industrial application has historically passed through 
a period of doctrinal confusion between sufficiency and utility and emerged in its 
present modern form where it is associated with insufficiency of disclosure only in 
rare cases of extraordinary inventions such as perpetual motion machines.89 (While 
such machines do not have industrial application, an alternate objection may be 
that the specification is not complete enough to allow the invention to be 
performed.) 
The conceptual link between industrial application and insufficiency in the 
UK in the period between 1932 and 1977 throws some light on present 
developments in US law. The overlap and relationship is explained in Valensi v 
British Radio Corporation Ltd:  
 
The objections of inutility and insufficiency overlap. To prove inutility it 
is, in our view, necessary to show that the invention so far as claimed, will 
not work as described or with any modification which the addressee can 
properly be expected to make. If any proposed modification is one which 
he cannot be expected to make then the specification is insufficient.’90 
 
In Blanco White’s words, ‘insufficiency is when you cannot make the thing, 
inutility is when you can but it doesn’t work when you have’.91 
In order to remove the considerable uncertainty that existed previously in the 
common law, the UK Patents Act 1932 introduced for the first time, the 
requirement of ‘utility’ as a separate ground on which a patent could be revoked in 
addition to the requirement that the complete specification should sufficiently and 
fairly describe the nature of the invention and manner in which the invention is to 
be performed.92 From 1932 to 1977 the link between ‘utility’ and sufficiency was 
interpreted to mean that every claim in the invention must be useful,93 and if a 
claim covered a mechanism or a process that did not produce the result, or one of 
the results claimed expressly or impliedly in the specification, the entire patent was 
deemed invalid.94  
This was regarded as a harsh position by the Banks Committee which 
recommended in 1970 that the lack of utility should be a ground for revocation 
                                                     
88 See E Pascal, ‘The Heightened Enablement Requirement for Gene Therapy Patents: Is Undue 
Experimentation the Undoing of Gene Therapy?’ (2005) 24 Biotechnology Law Reports 257. 
89 See Eastman Kodak Co v American Photo Booths Inc BL/O/457/02 and Manual of UK Patent Practice 
[4.05]. 
90 Valensi v British Radio Corporation Ltd [1972] FSR (CA (Civ Div)) 273, 312. 
91 Blanco White (n 73) [4–404].  
92 s 25(2)(e) and s 25(2)(f). 
93 Ng-Loy Wee Loon, ‘Patenting of Genes – A Closer Look at the Concepts of Utility and Industrial 
Applicability’ (2002) 33 International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 393, 403. 
94 See Norton and Gregory Ltd v Jacobs (1937) 54 RPC 271. This position, according to Ng-Loy Wee Loon, 
mirrors the literal construction of claims – an approach that was subsequently softened by the 
‘purposive’ approach to claim construction. Loon, ‘Patenting of Genes’ (n 93) 403–404.  
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only if the ‘invention claimed covers no useful embodiments’;95 if part of the 
subject matter of the application was useful the patent should be granted. 
Crucially, in order to address the danger of wide and speculative claims being filed 
the Committee identified the different functional possibilities of sufficiency of 
disclosure and inutility; it recommended that only the former be used to tackle 
broad claims. A statutory requirement was therefore proposed to deal with claims 
that were unduly wide, having regard to the disclosure in the complete 
specification.96 ‘Utility’ as ‘workability’ was therefore deemed redundant under the 
1977 Act. 97 Thus:  
 
It is important to remember that the old law which provided for revocation if 
the claims were not fairly based on the description or lacked utility was swept 
away by the 1977 Act. The law is now that set out in the 1977 Act. Section 
4(1) states that inventions shall be taken to be capable of industrial 
application ‘if it can be made […] in any kind of industry’.98  
 
This observation formalises the different functional roles played by ‘industrial 
application’ and ‘sufficiency of disclosure’ in modern UK law in contrast to the 
confusion between utility and disclosure and enablement in US law. While it could 
be argued that given the common legal history convergence in meaning between 
‘utility’ and ‘industrial application’ is to be expected, reading the former as fulfilling 
the latter, at the very least, opens up the possibility of an unwelcome throwback to 
the confusion that existed between 1932 and 1977 in the common law. 
Additionally ‘utility’ as it is championed by the US (via bilateral trade agreements 
and in WIPO negotiations) does not carry the same weight as usefulness applied 
under the rubric of ‘industrial’.99 Convergence in substantive meaning between 
utility and industrial application in common law jurisdictions calls for thorough 
judicial scrutiny. So far acceptance of the ‘specific, substantial and credible’ 
language in the UK has been piloted not so much by higher courts but by patent 
office practice – first by the EPO and then the UKIPO. 100 
Further, the specific, substantial and credible standard of utility, as it is 
developing in the US, appears explicitly linked to the state of the art evaluations, in 
order to ascertain what the patentee has disclosed in relation to what already exists 
in the field – an enquiry that is better made under the obviousness criterion. In Re 
                                                     
95 Committee on the Patent System and Patent Law, British Patent System: Report of the Committee to Examine 
the Patent System and Patent Law (1970–71), chaired by Maurice Banks, Cmnd 4407 [376]. 
96 Ibid [533]. This view coincided with a more ‘modern’ and favourable view of patents’. UK Patents Act 
1977 s 14(3). 
97 See Ford J’s observations on why ‘utility’ was dropped in favour of the requirement of sufficiency in 
Roussel Uclaf v Imperial Chemical Industries plc (No 3) [1991] RPC 51, 67. 
98 Chiron Corporation v Murex Diagnostics Ltd [1996]  FSR 153, 177 (Morritt LJ). 
99 Thambisetty (n 76) 160–170. 
100 ICOS Corp/Novel V 28 seven transmembrane receptor 6  OJEPO 293 (2002), Aeomica Inc BL O/286/05. 
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Fisher101 judge Rader notes the conceptual closeness between specific, substantial 
and credible and the ‘inventive step’ standard to conclude that policy concerns 
with inventions such as ESTs are better addressed through non-obviousness – a 
doctrine considerably hamstrung in US law by the In re Deuel102 decision.  
It is fruitful here to consider the law in Canada that also uses the ‘new and 
useful’ terminology.103 The doctrine of ‘sound prediction’ reaffirmed by the 
Canadian Supreme Court in Apotex v Wellcome Foundation Ltd104 is based on the 
public interest in the disclosure of new and useful inventions even before their 
utility has been verified by tests, while avoiding the cluttering of the public domain 
with useless patents and monopoly rights in exchange for misinformation.105 The 
Supreme Court noted that the key was to avoid ‘speculation’. The utility 
requirement is met at the priority date only if either it is demonstrated or there is 
sound prediction based on the information and expertise then available. First, 
there must be a factual basis for the prediction. Secondly, the inventor must have 
on the date of the patent application, an articulable and sound line of reasoning 
from which the desired result can be inferred on the factual basis. Thirdly, there 
must be adequate disclosure of the logic or reasoning used to achieve the 
prediction.106 ‘Sound prediction’ does not mean ‘certainty’ and is a more nuanced 
bridge between the requirement of ‘utility’, the cognitive ability to foresee 
technological innovations and improvements, and the information function of the 
patent system that requires in various measures sufficient disclosure, enablement, 






A major factor in the evolution of sufficiency of disclosure appears to be the 
increasing ‘Europeanisation’ of UK law that has, for example, made pre-1977 UK 
case law more relevant to Australia than post-1977 law. The UK is working ever 
closer with the EPO both in terms of procedure107  and substantive law,108  and 
this can either exacerbate or mitigate the differences with other common law 
jurisdictions. It has led for example in the case of fair basing, to divergence with 
Australian law, and in the case of the utility standard to convergence with many 
other major jurisdictions.  
                                                     
101 Re Fisher 421 F 3d 1367 (Fed Cir 2005), 1381–82. 
102 Re Deuel 51 F 3d 1552 (Fed Cir 1995). 
103 s 2 defines an invention as ‘any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement in any process, machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter’. 
104 Apotex v Wellcome Foundation Ltd [2002] SCC 77. 
105 Ibid [66]. 
106 Ibid [70].  
107 Ibid [66]. 
108 Ibid [66]. 
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Sufficiency of disclosure is often referred to as an ‘internal’ requirement of 
patentability in an attempt to signify that sufficiency is normally assessed after the 
other substantive criteria have been evaluated, or that it is not quite on par with 
other grounds of invalidity. However the picture emerging from the above 
discussion is one of a complex criterion, laced with the ‘rhetorical flourish’ of the 
patent bargain, and that in most common law jurisdictions appears to borrow 
elements from other substantive patentability requirements. Thus in the UK 
sufficiency has developed a ‘fair basing’ requirement that assesses ‘technological 
contribution to the art’ and in particular contexts, ‘non-obviousness’; in the US 
‘usefulness’ and ‘enablement’ are conflated. 
The content of sufficiency thus appears to draw on the approach to other 
grounds of invalidity determined by how strictly separate they can be or are kept 
during patentability evaluations that include consideration of more than one 
ground. Australia appears to have allowed pragmatism to trump complicated 
explorations of policy and purpose behind sufficiency provisions, and keeping 
grounds of invalidity separate appears to be a major preoccupation. Other 
jurisdictions do not seem to be as careful with the juxtaposition of the utility 
standard and sufficiency. Although the legal history of insufficiency shows 
overlaps between other grounds of invalidity, the quid pro quo in Liardet refers to 
the disclosure of the invention, not disclosure of the other substantive 
requirements such as inventive step or utility of the invention. It is only the 
common history that ensures in the face of significant diversity in patent 
disclosure requirements, and potential for confusion and error, that the quid pro 
quo of the patent bargain endures in spirit in the common law but it is an 
eviscerated spirit best put to rest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
